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Incentive Effects of Promotions on Employee Participation:
The Case of Korean Auto Workers
In many auto plants, only a limited number of first-line supervisory
positions are available to promotion candidates from production workers.
And mostly evaluation of workers is based on their work performances,
both on and off the production line.  This paper is to investigate how well
the promotion system of auto workers can elicit from them incentive
effects on their off-line performances, such as suggestions and QC circle
activities, using data from some Korean auto plants.
In the tournament games only the winner can advance to the next rounds
of competition.  The important feature of tournament is that the reward is
based on the rank order among competitors rather than absolute level of
their performances.  This type of reward system can be widely found in
competition for promotion in business organizations.  For example, many
hourly workers in manufacturing plants compete for a limited number of
supervisory positions; a number of vice presidents in a firm strive for one
coveted position of president.
The employee participation in improvement activities have been thought
of as one of the best practices taken in many auto plants around the world.
So we can find auto firms often evaluating their workers on the basis of
how good performances they show in off-line activities such as suggestions
and QC circles.  Or at least it is one of many evaluating items.  Since the
opportunity of promotions is limited but often known to production
workers in advance, it may be regarded as prizes open to candidates.
Tournament theory shows that compensation based on relative order can
give participants an incentive to provide an optimal level of efforts under
certain a set of assumptions.  It is often argued that the optimal level of
efforts depend positively on the price differential for winning the game.
There has been many studies to analyze the benefits and costs that
employee participation activities can give individual workers [Cooke
(1990)].  However, few attempts have been made to test if promotion
tournaments can induce workers to involve more actively in employee
participation.  In this study I seek to test the incentive effects of
promotion using data from a survey of Korean auto plants.
<Table 1>  Off-line Improvement Activities of Would Auto Industries.
______________________________________________________________________________
Korea Japan U.S.    Europe NIEs
number of suggestions
per employee(annual) 85  210 0.4 0.8 65
adoption rate(%) 44  80 27 30 44
workers in QC circles(%) 98  94 35 37 71
______________________________________________________________________________
Source:  MacDuffie and Pil, The International Assembly Plant Study, IMVP Research
Briefing Meeting, Berlin, 1994
1.  Suggestions and QC Circle Activities in Korean Auto Plants
It was early 1970s that production workers with Korean auto makers
began to conduct suggestions and QC circle activities.  Kia Motors started its
QC circle activities in 1972 and suggestion system in 1973.  Hyundai
Motors also implemented its suggestion system from 1975 and introduced
the management codes of QC circles in 1976.  Korean makers were in a
cooperative relationship with Japanese auto makers so that they could
learn suggestions and QC circle activities from Japanese auto makers.
Details of the suggestion system from suggestion procedure to organization
structure to award system were almost the same as those of Japanese
makers such as Toyota [Moden (1993)].
It was a time when Korean makers could build for the first time their own
comprehensive auto plants including engine manufacturing facilities.  As
the size of Korean domestic car market was getting bigger and the car
export rose from mid-1980s, these two types of employee participation got
more activated in each Korean auto maker.  Therefore in most of Korean
auto makers these type of employee participation have been implemented
for more than 20 years.  But some makers recently quit QC circle activities
and introduced new type of group activities instead.  QC circle itself is part
of formal organization of the work place in all Korean auto makers.  So QC
circle leader is in charge of regular work on the line as well as QC circle
activities.  Individual worker defines and examines the problem and then
generates ideas to solve it.  He then summarizes his ideas on a suggestion
form and submit it to his supervisor.  The supervisor should review on the
shop floor the contents of suggestions from his subordinate workmen.
The contents of suggestion and QC circle activities can be classified into 6
categories:  quality, work method, tool handling, machinery and
equipment, so-called 5S, and management method.  Every month the
evaluation starts at the department that the individual workers or QC
circles belong to.  Whether or not a suggestion will be adopted is
determined at the department level.
For example, at Kia Motors, a suggestion is supposed to be given one of ten
grades depending on its score.   The suggestion committee at each level
assesses suggestions recommended from its subordinate committees.  So
once adopted, suggestions proceed to higher level suggestion committee
and earn better grades.  The amount of award money usually depend on
the grade earned.  Beside award money, some auto makers give additional
fringe benefits to those workers showing high performance in
improvement activities.  Moreover the record on individual workers'
suggestion and QC circle activities is reflected in the personnel evaluation
conducted periodically.
<Table 2>  Off-line Improvement Activities in Some Korean Auto Plants
___________________________________________________________________________
'85 '86 '87 '88 '89 '90 '91 '92 '93
Number of suggestions
per employee(annual)  10  13  21  94  38  20  14  23  26
Number of activities
per circle(annual)  3.1  2.9  3.1  3.7  2.6  1.7  2.0  2.1  1.8
___________________________________________________________________________
Source:  M and N auto plants, "Improvement Activities Report", 1994
2.  Personnel System for Production Workers in Korean Auto Industry
(1) Organization and Job Positions
The formal organization of Korean auto plants looks like a pyramid.  The
plant consists of several divisions called "Boo," which are headed by
general managers named "Boojang."  Each division has also several
departments called "Gwa" led by a production manager named "Gwajang."
The production manager are supported by assistant manager and chief
supervisor.  The production managers in Korean auto plants are selected
from white color workers.  Production workers can promote to chief
supervisor.  In each department there are about 4 sections or 80 workmen
whose heads are supervisors named 'Banjang' or 'Jigjang'.  One section
usually consists of 2 or 3 teams or about 20 workmen and each team have
7 to 12 workmen.
<Table 3>  Job Positions and Composition of Production Workers
___________________________________________________________________________
Job Level Job Position
Company A Company B
3rd level Chief Supervisor (9) 0.7% (5) 0.6%
4th level A Supervisor (7) 4.5% (5) 2.4%
4th level B (2) 3.0%
Non-job level Team leader  (3) 9.3% (3) 9.5%
Worker   (3) 85.6% (3) 84.6%
___________________________________________________________________________
Source:  A and B Motors' Manpower Management Departments
Note:  number in parenthesis is minimum required years for job promotion.
(2) Promotions and Evaluation System
Promotions to team leaders and supervisors are possible only when there
are some vacancies in those positions.  So opportunities of job promotions
are available to workers either when current team leaders or supervisors
are about to leave the company for any reasons or when new positions are
created because of organizational expansion.  As an exception, in some
companies, job promotion to a position higher than supervisor is not
limited by the organization structure.  However, even in the case, the
organization table is surely considered as a basis upon which management
adjusts the number of supervisory positions.
Such structure of organization indicates that the opportunities of job
promotion in Korean auto plants is quite restricted and that the
competition among candidates becomes very fierce.  Promotions to
supervisory positions requires some qualifications including minimum
years of employment in lower position.
Evaluation items includes periodic personnel evaluation, written test,
report, seniority and education performance.  Weight of a sum of personnel
evaluation and written test ranges from 70 to 95% in Korean auto
companies.  Personnel evaluation of workers' performance and ability is
conducted periodically by supervisors in next higher position.  Of course,
suggestion and QC circle contribution are reflected in this personnel
evaluation.
(3) Pay System
<figure 1>  Hyundai's Wage Structure for Production Workers
Basic Hourly Pay
Tenure Allowance
Family Allowance
Productivity Improvement
Allowance
Night Shift Allowance
Job-position Allowance
Basic Wage
Other Fixed Allowance
Overtime/Overnight Allowance
Monthly Wage
Special Wage         Bi-monthly Bonus
Wage
Source:  Hyundai Motors and Hyundai Motors labor Union, 1994
When a production worker is hired, his pay grade is decided depending on
his background:  Job experience prior to entrance, skill certificate, and
military experience.  Every year his pay is upgraded as his seniority builds
up or as he is promoted to higher job positions.  The pay upgrade or pay
promotion is allowed almost automatically to workers unless they
committed serious misconduct.  In the past there was a special upgrade
system by which managers could discriminate their workers in evaluation
according to attitudes and performances they had shown.  This system was
abolished in collective bargaining of the late 1980s by the request of labor
unions.
Wage increase incurred by annual upgrade is usually much smaller than
wage gain by wage negotiation conducted every year.   The most
remarkable feature of wage structure in Korean auto industry is that
production workers' wage depends heavily on their personal
characteristics like seniority rather than on those of jobs they hold.  Only
less than 7% of wage is related to jobs and job positions.
<Table 4>  Decomposition of Wage:  Korean Automakers
__________________________________________________________________
| |      Company |
| | A B  C  |
|__________________________________________________________________
|  wage related to personal | |
|          characteristics | 93.8% 96.1% 93.5% |
| | |
|  wage related to job or | |
|          job or job position | 6.2% 3.9% 6.5% |
|__________________________________________________________________
Source:  Daewoo, Hyundai, Kia Motors
As explained above, it does seem that the personnel system of Korean auto
makers provides production workers with little opportunity to promote to
higher positions.
Also, its wage system weighs against jobs and job positions a worker holds.
So one can expect that most of the workers feel little incentive to invest
their efforts to show better performance while competing for good jobs or
job positions.  According to interviews with workers and managers, job
promotions in Korean auto plants is almost automatically in seniority
order.  It is said that jobs preferred by workers are assigned to senior
workers.
3.  Tournament Theory
In tournament games only winners can advance to next rounds of
competitions.  The important feature of tournament game is that in this
type of reward system matters their relative ordering among competitors
rather than their absolute records or scores.  The tournament theory has
studied how participants would respond when this system is put into
effect, how much effort they would make to win a race, or what would
determine the optimal level of efforts.  It also deals with how and why the
prize structure of a tournament or players' characteristics can gain
something to do with the level of efforts. [Lazear and Rosen (1991), Green
and Stokey (1993), Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983)]
We can find this tournament style reward system applying to various
types of competition like promotions in the business organizations as well
as in sport games.  Salespersons are often paid a bonus according to their
relative rank in a sales competition with other colleagues.  Several vice-
presidents also compete for one coveted position of president in a firm.
And in an auction one who makes a bid for a good with a bit higher price
would win.
Bull, Schotter, and Weigett(1987) illustrates using a simplified model of
non-cooperative game that the efforts level chosen by agents in the
tournaments will increase proportionally with the prize differential for
winning while they will move inversely with both the cost of effort and
variance of random shock to output.   Many researchers also studied under
what conditions tournament system might dominate other forms of
incentive systems[Lazear and Rosen(1981) and Green and Stokey(1983)].
There have been few attempts made to test using corporate data whether
tournaments can elicit expected effort response.  Ehrenberg and
Bognanno(1988, 1990) tested it using data from professional golf
tournaments and showed that tournaments' prize structures affect players'
performances.
4.  Analytical Framework
My econometric work is based on implications derived from a simple
model of two-contestants non-cooperative game as in Bull, Schotter, and
Weigett(1987).  As mentioned earlier, each production worker's
involvement in employee participation such as suggestion and QC circle
activities depend on his efforts, a pure random or luck component, and
some specific factors such as work load, adversity of work environment,
labor relation on the shop floor.  We assume that for simplification the last
two factors affect all workers in a promotion competition equally.  Here an
important assumption is that production workers select their effort levels
in doing suggestion and QC circle activities.  This may be not the case.  One
can argue that they always do their best in doing suggestion and QC circle
activities.  It is also emphasized that this type of improve activities should
be done on a voluntary basis.
However, as shown in <Table 2>, workers' performance of suggestion and
QC circle activities has not been consistent but been fluctuated over years.
We also heard from managers that many times they had to urge workers
to make efforts for suggestion and QC circle activities.  Furthermore, to
most of workers these improvement activities are not so easy.
They should invest their extra time in studying or make more efforts to
achieve improvement.  This means that all workers face some cost of
efforts to involve actively in employee participation.
Given a prize structure and cost of efforts, each worker is assumed to
choose his efforts level to maximize his expected gain(utility).  Under mild
conditions we can show there exists a solution of optimal effort level.
Eij = fij((w1-w2), Ajo, Ajc, Di) + eij
Here Eij is individual j's number of suggestions in a department i, w1-w2 is
the wage differential for promotion, Ajo and Ajc are measures of the
player's own ability and his competitor's ability, Di is the department-
specific factors, and eij is a random shock.
5.  Estimation
In deciding on whether to promote one employee, worker's performance of
employee participation is reflected in evaluation with a fixed weight given
to it in some auto makers while others don't set such a fixed weight and
leave it to supervisors.
However, even if its share is fixed, the importance of suggestion and QC
circle activities can be subject to change across departments or by
supervisors.
The optimal efforts level will be determined by various factors which have
something to do with cost.  Those can be age, education, tenure, the extent
of job rotations, and help from colleagues or supervisors.  They can affect
efforts level in two different ways.  It is because it alters the absolute level
of cost while it also changes relative rank among participants.  The higher
their cost of effort is, the less efforts will be exerted by workers.  Also if
they show large difference in their ability it is expected that they will
make less efforts.
(1) Data
Data used in this study was obtained from survey of individual workers
and documents provided by both departments of human resource
management and of quality management at two Korean auto plants in
1993.  First I could get two different sets of data on suggestions.  One is
from survey of individual workers.  They are asked how many suggestions
they made in 1992 and how many of them were actually adopted.  From
the department of quality management I could collect number of
suggestions and QC circle activities which were added up by each
department.
Survey on individual workers also include their answer to questions to ask
their opinions about promotion, wage, work rules and working
environment, shop floor labor relation, communication, training and so on.
Another set of data collected from department of human resource
management shows us who was promoted to a leader or supervisor in
which team or which department.  According to this source the supervisor
is appointed to an organization among many candidates from the same
organization without exception.  This is also true to the case of team leader.
That is, a new team leader is selected from team workers belonging to the
same team.  In the survey of individual workers were the questionnaire
sent to a total of 4,000 workers, which were sampled proportionally by
plant, grade, and department from the population and amounted to almost
30% of the population.  Among them 2,960 were returned.
From the survey number of suggestions done annually by individual
worker(SUG) and number of suggestions adopted(SUGA) were used as
dependent variables in the regression analysis.   These were what
individual workers answered to questions like how many suggestions they
made and how many among them were adopted.   In the data from the
department of quality management were included number of suggestions
done in 1992 by each department, number of adopted ones, and number of
QC circle activities in each department.  The variables such as the rate of
suggestion attainment (RSUG= # suggestions/# goal), the rate of adoption
(RIMP= # adopted suggestions/# goal), and the rate of QC circle activities
attainment(RQCA = # QC circle activities/# goal) were all derived from this
source.  Using the data from the department of human resource
management we can also introduce the variables to illustrate whether
there is a new leader appointed as of early April in 1993(CHO), ! a ratio of
new leaders to all workers in the department(LEADER), a ratio of new
supervisors to all workers in the department(SUPERV), and a ratio of new
chief supervisors to all workers in the department(CHIEF).
There are many other variables derived from the survey.  In the next the
regression analysis will be done in two ways.  The one is to study how
individual workers' suggestion activities are related to promotion
opportunities available to a team, using data on suggestions to individual
workers and promotions such as SUG, SUGA, and CHO.
This other is to analyze how the group performances of conducting
suggestions and QC circle activities in the department level are related to
promotions opportunities available to a department, using mainly the data
from the department of quality management like variables of LEADER,
SUPERV, and CHIEF.
Among other variables collected from the survey are the indices
measuring work environments, communication and work attitude, labor
relations, and work system.  Demographic variables are also available from
the survey.  Especially for analysis on a department basis we derive some
department-specific variables from the survey of individual workers.
They are the department average or stand deviation calculated using
individual workers' responses only by those in non-job level.  The prefix M
in a variable indicates it is the department average and S a department
standard deviation, respectively.
Communication and work attitude:  To investigate the relation
between communication and work attitude of production worker on the
one hand and employee participation on the other hand.  They include the
degree to which production workers feel comfortable in communicating
with their supervisors (UCOM, 1= very uncomfortable,.. 5= very
comfortable) and the average level of UCOM in a department (MUC), the
extent of workers' commitment to the company (COMMIT, 1=very low
commitment,.. 5=very high commitment) and its average (MCOMMIT) and
standard deviation (SCOMMIT) in a department.
Workers' preference between higher wage and higher job position is
reflected in PVSW (1=higher wage is much more preferred,... 5=higher
position is much more preferred.)
Work system:  It indicates in part how work is organized and how much
different job experience workers have had.  For example, the extent of job
rotation across teams is reflected in MROTATE(1= very infrequent,..
5=very frequent).  MULTI shows how many different tasks a worker have
carried out since he enter the company.
Work environment:  This index measures the extent of danger to which
workers are exposed (MDANGER), the degree of tedium or boredom which
workers feel while carrying out their jobs (MTED), workload(MHEAVY).
Labor relation on the shop floor:  This includes indices measuring the
relation with team leader (LREL, 1=very hostile,..   5=very friendly), the
relation with supervisor (SREL).  The degree of managerial leadership
supervisors can exert on the shopfloor (SAUTHO, 1=very limited,..  5=very
extensive).
(2)  Estimation Outcomes
<Table 5>  Descriptive Statistics:  Survey of Individual Workers (N=550)
_______________________________________________________________________
Variable Content    Mean   Std Dev
_______________________________________________________________________
PLANT 0=M plant, 1=N plant    0.50727   0.5004022
PART 1=line work, 2=otherwise   1.18181   0.3860457
PVSW promotion preference    2.27372   1.0975639
ROT job rotation(1-5)    2.06077   1.0119165
MULTI multi-task experience   4.85454   4.6686888
UCOM upward communication    3.30418   0.8545716
COMMIT workers' commitment    3.83180   0.8796920
LREL relation with leader    3.56410   0.6776327
SREL relation with supervisor   3.38686   0.7205338
SUG annual # of suggestions 48.42909 57.4737563
SUGA adopted suggestions  21.00545 39.0720922
MARRIED 1 if married, 0 if not   0.59636   0.4910728
EDUC years of schooling  11.92727   0.6843168
TENURE years of employment    4.83196   2.9671958
MUC depts' average of UCOM   3.29458   0.2897003
MCOMMIT depts' average of COMMIT    3.78704   0.2087347
MSR depts' average of SREL   3.57899   0.1552419
MTED extent of tedium/boredom   2.98082   0.4003617
MDANGER danger at worksite    1.85126   0.4088435
MHV degree of workload    3.20836   0.2926097
MRT extent of job rotation   2.04436   0.3690756
SPW std.  dev.  of PVSW    1.11603   0.1852928
MRT extent of job rotation   2.04436   0.3690756
SPW std.  dev.  of PVSW    1.11603   0.1852928
SMULTI std.  dev.  of MULTI    3.8556113   2.3674003
SAG  std.  dev.  of AGE    3.0132946   1.5921344
SED std.  dev.  of EDUC    0.4482650   0.5356879
LEADER # new leaders in a team   0.3636364   0.6924952
SUPERV new supervisors/workers   0.0032734   0.0044317
CHIEF new chiefs/workers    0.0001916   0.0005721
_______________________________________________________________________
As we can see in Table 6, the analysis shows that workers' participation in
suggestion activities is positively related with their preference for
promotion while being negatively related with their workload and the
extent of job rotation.
<Table 6>  Regression Analysis of Individual Workers' Suggestions
________________________________________________________________________
| Dependent Variable:  SUG(# suggestions) |
________________________________________________________________________
| Variables  | Estimate | t-value |
________________________________________________________________________
| Intercept  |       -214.563366 |  -2.723*  |
| MCOMMIT  | 48.662802 |    3.744**  |
| MRT   |         -52.857968 |  -5.265**  |
| MSR   | 34.815686 |    1.888  |
| MHV   |         -25.222538 |  -2.620*  |
| SPW   | 45.558320 |    3.359**  |
| SMULTI  | -2.491657 |  -2.026  |
| PVSW   |   4.701314 |    2.184  |
| PART   |          -19.722162 |  -2.017  |
| MLR   | 47.034343 |    2.129  |
| TENURE  | -1.726219 |  -2.081  |
| MTED   |         -12.850982 |  -1.200  |
________________________________________________________________________
| R2 |   0.1188 | |
________________________________________________________________________
* Statistically significant at the .05 level; ** at the 0.01 level.
Moreover if statistically insignificant, the suggestion activities is likely to
decline as workers stay longer in the company, which may imply they give
up a promotion to supervisory positions after a certain period of time.  The
promotion opportunities are not likely to have any signification relation
with intensity of suggestion activities.  So we may interpret this as that the
promotion policies in this auto plants do not motivate workers to devote
themselves to employee participation like suggestion.
<Table 7>  Regression Analysis of Adopted Suggestions
________________________________________________________________________
| Dependent Variable:  SUGA(# of adopted suggestions) |
________________________________________________________________________
| Variables  | Estimate | t-value  |
________________________________________________________________________
| Intercept  | 24.947761 |   0.663  |
| LEADER |   6.309733 |   2.598* |
| TENURE  | -1.004035 | -1.772  |
| MHV   |         -14.553006 | -2.421*  |
| MDANGER  | -8.440612 | -1.951  |
| MCOMMIT  | 14.636193 |   1.833  |
| PVSW   |   2.450813 |   1.611  |
________________________________________________________________________
| R2 0.0377 |
________________________________________________________________________
On the other hand, the number of adopted suggestions showed a significant
correlation with promotion opportunities.   Workers belonging to a circle
where a new leader was promoted have 6 more adopted suggestions than
those from other circles do.  So one can argue that competition for
promotion does elicit more effective suggestion efforts from workers.
Next the suggestion and QC circle activities will be analyzed on a
department basis.  For this purpose we derive some department- specific
variables from the survey of individual workers.  They are the department
average or stand deviation calculated using individual workers' responses.
Data of 60 department were finally usable in the analysis.  Among
variables not explained in the above are RSUG(ratio of number of
suggestions to goal), RADOPT (ratio of number of adopted suggestions to
goal), and RQCA(QC circle activities/goal).
Two other important variables used in the regression analysis are MPROD
and MQUAL.  These are the department averages of  workers' responses to
questions like 'What do you think about productivity change over past 3
years?' and 'What do you think about quality change over past 3
years?'(The workers chose one of 5 given answers like 1= seriously
deteriorated, 2= deteriorated,..., 5=remarkably improved.) YP means time
elapsed after minimum years required for promotion to leader.
In this regression analysis, what we used as information on suggestions
and QC circle activities is data from the department of quality management
rather than those from workers survey.   The contestants will get more
motivated if more promotion opportunities are available because their
expected value of promotion rises.  To test this we will regress promotion
opportunities and other explanatory variables on suggestion attainment,
the suggestion adoption rate, and QC circle activities attainment.  These
three dependent variables were expressed in a logistic form(LRSUG,
LRADOPT and LRQCA).  What we pay attention to is whether there is a
significantly positive relation between these dependent variables and
degree of promotion opportunities.
Furthermore it will be of great interest to see whether  suggestions,
adoption rate and QC circle activities have strong correlation with
promotion.
The relationship between extent of job rotation and employee participation
is also of great interest.  We adopted the method of stepwise regression
when choosing explanatory variables in the regressions.  As we can find
out from <Table 9> there is no strong correlation between suggestion
attainment and promotions.  As it was when using individual workers'
data, the adoption rate shows statistically significant correlation with
promotions only in some plants.
<Table 8>  Descriptive Statistics on Department Basis (n=60)
______________________________________________________________________________
Variable content   Min Max Mean S.D
______________________________________________________________________________
RSUG suggestions attainment   0    4.83   0.80 0.816
RADOPT adoption rate     0    1.58   0.29 0.306
RQCA QC activity attainment   0    4.06   0.53 0.598
MAGE average age   23.80 41.16 30.05 2.959
SAGE s.d.  of age     0.80   9.34   3.26 1.961
MEDUC average yrs schooling   9.50 14.13 11.95 0.503
MMAR ratio of married workers   0   1.00   0.59 0.224
MCOM average COMMIT    2.80   4.50   3.79 0.307
SCOMMIT s.d.  of COMMIT    0.35   1.37   0.81 0.253
MSREL average of SREL    2.78   4.50   3.40 0.267
MLREL average of LREL    2.89   4.75   3.61 0.246
MSAUTHO average of SAUTHO    1.80   3.77   2.81 0.361
MWAGE wage satisfaction    1.60   2.57   2.00 0.210
MYP average of YP  -1.57 13.00   2.44 2.594
MTED extent of tedium/boredom   1.60   3.80   2.74 0.525
MDANGER degree of danger    1.00   3.60   2.01 0.583
MHV degree of workload   2.40   4.08   3.16 0.356
MROTATE extent of job rotation   1.33   3.57   2.28 0.506
MSUG # of suggestions    4.00           178.33 41.33           28.016
MADOPT # of adopted suggestions   2.00 59.75 19.20           12.667
MPROD productivity improvement  3.10   4.50   3.93 0.315
MQUAL quality improvement    2.40   3.66   2.99 0.280
MPFAIR fairness in promotion   1.56   3.40   2.39 0.406
MEFAIR fairness in evaluation   1.83   3.60   2.76 0.350
LCONTEST # contestants        0   1.00   0.70 0.262
CHIEF new chief in a department     0   0.002 0.00007         0.00038
SUPERV new supervisors in a dept       0   0.025 0.004 0.005
LEADER new team leaders in a dept     0   0.259   0.04 0.059
MPL dummy(0 if M plant)       0   1.00   0.43 0.484
______________________________________________________________________________
Source:  Kia Economic Research Institute, "Survey on Personnel System for Auto
Production Workers in Korea," 1993
<Table 9>  Regression Analysis:  Suggestion Attainment
__________________________________________________________________
| Dependent Variable:  LRSUG(Rate of suggestion attainment)           |
__________________________________________________________________
|      All | M Plant  |       N Plant          |
__________________________________________________________________
| Intercept   -7.595150 | Intercept 0.68755 | Intercept    221.234         |
|  (-0.083) |  (3.242)** |  (2.010)         |
| MCOMMIT  23.71369 | MROTATE -0.19944 | MWAGE     -109.9434        |
|  ( 1.463) |  (-2.122)* | (-1.925)       |
| MWAGE    -39.313532 | |             |
|  (-1.517) | |             |
| R2   0.1022 | R2 0.1305 |  R2 0.1247          |
__________________________________________________________________
* numbers in parentheses are t-values
More opportunities of promotions to supervisor shows strong positive
correlation with adoption rate in M plant as we can see in <Table 10>.
Promotions to leaders are also positively related to adoption rate.  That the
adoption rate is higher as MYP is larger may be explained as seniority
effect.  That is, the department with more senior workers is likely to show
higher adoption rate.  On the other hand, QC circle activities in M plant are
likely to decline as there are more workers with long seniority.
<Table 10>  The Adoption Rate
______________________________________________________________
| Dependent Variable:  LRADOPT (the adoption rate) |
______________________________________________________________
| All  | M Plant | N Plant  |
______________________________________________________________
| Constant 6.920360 | Constant -2.33707 | Constant 8.678202 |
|  (1.035) |  (-1.476) |  ( 0.617) |
| MYP 0.722341 | MEDUC 0.21626 | MCOMMIT -7.225635 |
|  (2.759)** |  ( 1.629) |  (-2.177)* |
| MSAUTHO -2.088351 | LEADER 4.05701 | MYP  2.035199 |
|  (-1.535) |  ( 1.793) |  (2.573)* |
| MPFAIR 2.995481 | SUPERV 58.76518 | MPFAIR 6.633835 |
|  (2.065)* |  ( 2.559)* |  (1.973) |
| MCOMMIT -2.613728 | | |
|  (-1.543) | | |
| | | |
| R2   0.1776 | R2 0.3750 | R2 0.3371 |
______________________________________________________________
To our surprise, the extent of job rotation show negative correlation with
suggestions in M plant and with QC circle activities in N plant, respectively.
It may be possible because job rotations are conducted mainly for sharing
hard or tedious works among workers rather than for developing workers
skill level in Korean auto plants.  This point was partially confirmed in the
interviewed with workers and supervisors and in other study [LEE(1994)].
The fairness in promotion decision process has a positive relationship with
the adoption rate, as expected.  The averages years of schooling also shows
positive correlation with QC circle activities.  The older the workers in a
department are, the higher the adoption rate is.  The higher adoption rate
is correlated with small age dispersion in a department.  It may be because
the competition gets more severe if workers are around the same age.
As the extent of commitment to the company is quite different among
workers, a department is likely to have more QC circle activities.  It may
reflect the fact that SCOMMIT is positively correlated with MCOMMIT and
higher SCOMMIT makes a decision process quicker in QC circles.
<Table 11>  QC Circle Activities
______________________________________________________________
| Dependent Variable:  LRQCA(QC circle activity attainment)  |
______________________________________________________________
| All  | M Plant | N Plant  |
______________________________________________________________
| Constant -247.382 | Constant -512.17366 | Constant 1.596906 |
|  (-4.157)** |  (-4.766)** |  ( 2.108)* |
| SCOMMIT 19.768 | SCOMMIT 36.86095 | MROTATE -0.138312 |
|  ( 2.894)** |  ( 3.867)** |  (-2.360)* |
| MEDUC 12.0342 | MEDUC 27.94258 | MEDUC -0.094582 |
|  ( 3.487)** |  ( 4.828)** |  (-1.559) |
| MAGE 3.019313 | MAGE 7.33411 |    |
|  ( 3.488)** |  ( 3.675)** |    |
| SAGE -2.692738 | LEADER 119.84679 |    |
|  (-2.119)*   ( 1.772) |    |
| MENV -5.1386 | MYP -5.16375 |    |
|  (-1.887) |  (-2.211)* |    |
| MPFAIR 7.1758 | MWAGE -32.54636 |    |
|  ( 1.465) |  (-2.191)* |    |
|    |    |    |
| R2   0.3546 | R2 0.6320 | R2 0.2282 |
______________________________________________________________
However, the correlation between productivity and improvement activities
shows some inconsistency.  In M plant a department with a higher
suggestion attainment rate was likely to achieve a considerable
productivity increase over the past 3 years, but the adoption rate shows
negative relation with it.
In N plant there was a large productivity improvement as QC circle activity
attainment was high while the effect of high adoption rate is opposite to
our expectation.  So it is very hard to evaluate the effect of suggestion and
QC circle activities on productivity with this outcome.  The opportunity of
promotion does not show any significant relation with productivity
improvement.
<Table 12>  Productivity Improvement
______________________________________________________________
| Dependent Variable:  MPROD (Productivity Improvement)  |
______________________________________________________________
| All  | M Plant | N Plant  |
______________________________________________________________
| Constant 2.8736 | Constant 1.974151 | Constant -2.035190 |
|  (3.302)** |  (5.942)** |  (-2.240)* |
| MEDUC -0.121225 | MHEAVY 0.174623 | MWAGE 1.047349 |
| (-1.833) |  (1.963) |  (4.815)** |
| MHEAVY 0.374542 | RIMP -1.289030 | MCOMMIT 0.824822 |
|  (3.772)** |  (-5.912)** |  (5.234)** |
| MWAGE 0.626731 | RSUG 0.294023 | MTED  0.191809 |
|  (3.265)** |  (4.463)** |  (2.699)** |
| RSUG 0.082087 | MSAUTH 0.498854 | RQCA 0.527465 |
|  (1.928) |  (5.816)** |  (3.588)** |
|   | SUPERV 26.721519 | RSUG -0.129520 |
|    |  (2.840)** |  (-2.141)* |
|    |    | MLREL 0.251239 |
|    |   |  (1.849) |
|    |    | LEADER 0.778362 |
|    |    |  (1.630) |
|    |   | MSAUTH -0.343614 |
|    |    |  (-3.091)** |
| | | |
| R2   0.3195 | R2 0.7667 | R2 0.7863 |
______________________________________________________________
In <Table 13>, the regression outcomes show that quality improvement
have positive relation with promotion in M plant and it is also positively
correlated with QC circle activity in N plant as expected.
<Table 13>  Quality Improvement
_________________________________________
| Dependent Variable:  MQUAL (Quality Improvement)|
_________________________________________
| M Plant  | N Plant |
_________________________________________
| Constant 7.036013 | Constant 3.749105 |
|   (7.913)** |   (6.129)** |
| MMAR  0.452760 | SCOMMIT -0.336736 |
|   (2.054)* |   (-1.835) |
| SAGE  0.053065 | MWAGE  0.371408 |
|   (2.794)** |   (1.965) |
| SCOMMIT -0.515806 | MHV  -0.173870 |
|   (-4.125)** |   (-1.552) |
| MWAGE  -0.335946 | MSAUTH  0.216676 |
|   (-1.876) |   (2.311)* |
| MLREL  -1.488534 | MPFAIR -0.765205 |
|   (-4.410)** |   (-5.747)** |
| LEADER  2.514359 | QRCA  0.282415 |
|   (2.519)** |   (3.187)** |
| LCONTEST 0.651101 | MROTATE  0.297368 |
|   (2.162) |   (3.568)** |
| MSREL  0.382061 |     |
|   (1.807) |     |
| SUPERV -19.764253 |     |
|   (-2.016) |     |
|    |     |
| R2 0.7512 | R2 0.7105 |
_________________________________________
5.  Conclusion
Korean auto makers adopted basically a seniority-based principle in many
areas of personnel management.  So most of job promotions and wage
upgrade is made automatically as workers accumulate their seniority
without providing motivation for competition.  They compete for
supervisory positions but the opportunities are so limited.  The incentive
effects of promotion is found not to be prevailing in Korean auto plants.
Only in some plants where the plant does not expand any more the effect
of promotion competition among workers are partly confirmed.
In fast growing plant there seems to be no incentive effects of promotion.
So current personnel system seems to fail in eliciting more efforts for
suggestion, QC circle activities, productivity improvement, and quality
improvement from workers.
Furthermore in Korea the job rotation within team and across teams is not
carried out with a view to flexible human resource management so that it
may not help workers raise their problem- solving ability.  Korean auto
makers have sought some reform in personnel management system these
days.  It should be noted that the reform must come up with some devices
to provide workers with more incentives for efforts and to enable makers
to introduce more flexible human resource management as well as to
support education for workers.
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Appendix:  Regression of Individual Workers' Suggestions by
Plant
<Table A-1>  Descriptive Statistics: M Plant (n=271)
____________________________________________
 Variable  Mean  Std Dev
____________________________________________
  PART    1.1992620   0.4001845
  PVSW    2.3025830   1.1598023
  ROTATION   1.9518519   0.9608973
  MULTI    5.3911439   4.7330746
  COMMIT    3.7888889   0.9063319
  LREL    3.5498155   0.6356026
  SREL    3.3431734   0.6914421
  SUG  47.8339483 47.8839464
  SUGA  19.0738007 45.7021972
  MARRIED    0.7232472   0.4482209
  EDUC 11.8413284   0.8123517
  TENURE    6.4274293   3.1881277
  MUC    3.2312855   0.3125070
  MDC    2.5523201   0.4006538
  MAH    3.3515202   0.1902984
  MJH    3.1220287   0.2472085
  MCOMMIT    3.7362431   0.1683836
  MSAUTHO   2.8606524   0.2533686
  MSREL    3.3325748   0.1794522
  MLREL    3.5606705   0.1252057
  MTED    2.9774652   0.4365228
  MDANGER    1.7380059   0.3818805
  MHV    3.2657646   0.3180760
  MROTATION   1.9750504   0.4262729
  SPW    1.1800111   0.1971171
  SM    3.7813199   1.9770385
  SAG    3.9828536   1.5866633
  SED    0.6567195   0.5329141
  LEADER    0.2915129   0.4867522
  CHIEF    0.000388901   0.000767241
  SUPERV    0.0012700   0.0026147
<Table A-2>  Regression of Annual Suggestions:  M Plant
______________________________________________
| Dependent Variable:  SUG(# of suggestions)    |
______________________________________________
| Variables  | Estimates | t-value  |
______________________________________________
| INTERCEP  | -157.760892 |  -1.397  |
| PART   | -24.725346 |  -2.377*  |
| TENURE  | -2.182198 | -2.500*  |
| MHV   | -28.540319 |  -2.596*  |
| SPW   | 37.051031 | 2.323  |
| MROTATION | -24.288640 | -2.074  |
| MLREL   | 108.512031 | 3.749**  |
| LREL   | -9.475008 | -2.185  |
| SEDUC   | -13.168938 | -1.908  |
| SUPERV  | 2076.282709 | 1.826  |
______________________________________________
| R2 0.1720 |
______________________________________________
<Table A-3>  Regression of Annual Adopted Suggestions:  M plant
______________________________________________
| Dependent Variable:  SUGA(# of adopted suggestions) |
______________________________________________
| Variables  | Estimates | t-value  |
______________________________________________
| INTERCEP  | 96.102398 |  1.104  |
| MLO   |  -45.870585 | -2.669*  |
| TENURE  | -1.577224 | -1.815  |
| MCR   | 29.346313 |  1.259  |
______________________________________________
| R2 0.0365 |
______________________________________________
<Table A-4> Descriptive Statistics:  M Plant (N=279)
______________________________________________
  Variables  Mean  Std Dev
______________________________________________
  PART    1.1648746   0.3717341
  PVSW    2.2454874   1.0343850
  ROTATION   2.1684982   1.0506460
  MULTI    4.3333333   4.5534397
  UCOM    3.3956835   0.8292374
  COMMIT    3.8736462   0.8524849
  LREL    3.5781818   0.7175310
  SREL    3.4296029   0.7466768
  SUG  49.0071685 65.5417376
  SUGA  22.8817204 31.2899584
  MARRIED    0.4731183   0.5001740
  EDUC  12.0107527   0.5192958
  TENURE    3.2822581   1.6197241
  MUC    3.3560707   0.2513742
  MDC    2.4874694   0.3723018
  MAH   3.3979191   0.1885805
  MJH   3.2534333   0.2497826
  MCOMMIT   3.8363867   0.2314022
  MSAUTHO   2.7965045   0.1944020
  MSREL   3.4177102   0.1865848
  MLREL   3.5967987   0.1781081
  MTED   2.9840900   0.3625638
  MENV   1.9612670   0.4047374
  MHV   3.1526157   0.2539551
  MROTATION   2.1116967   0.2886015
  MPF   2.6152069   0.2101583
  MEF   2.9482729   0.1897716
  SPW   1.0538942   0.1489970
  SM   3.9280321   2.6957745
  SAG   2.0715366   0.8685781
  SED   0.2457878   0.4553779
  LEADER   0.4336918   0.8407844
  SUPERV   0.0052194   0.0049429
______________________________________________
<Table A-5>  Regression of Annual Suggestion:  N plant
______________________________________________
| Dependent Variable:  SUG (# suggestions)    |
______________________________________________
| Variables  | Estimates | t-value  |
______________________________________________
| Constant  | 177.685750 |  1.449  |
| MCOMMIT  |  59.131270 |  3.393**  |
| MPFAIR  | -93.756938 | -3.975**  |
| MHV   | -68.564981 | -3.782**  |
| SAG   |  -26.710194 | -4.122**  |
| SED   | 52.453103 |  4.262**  |
| MUC   | 45.703130 |  2.572*  |
| PVSW   | 6.652161 |  1.868  |
| LEADER  |  6.427381 |  1.436  |
| UCOM   | -6.811365 | -1.406  |
______________________________________________
| R2 0.1985 |
______________________________________________
<Table A-6> Regression of Adopted Suggestions:  N Plant
______________________________________________
| Dependent Variable:  SUGA (# adopted suggestions)    |
______________________________________________
| Variables  | Estimates | t-value  |
______________________________________________
| Constant  | -136.703430 |  -3.303**  |
| MCOMMIT  | 45.028520 |  5.378**  |
| LEADER  |  7.093302 |  3.364**  |
| MUC   | 20.707575 |  2.305*  |
| PVSW  |  3.022097 |  1.794  |
| MLREL  | -25.559005 |  -1.771  |
| COMMIT  | -4.612720 |  -2.034  |
| LREL  |  4.814555 |  1.841  |
______________________________________________
| R2 0.1708 |
______________________________________________
